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Rejoinder to Veldman’s review of Capitalism, Corporations and the
Social Contract: A Critique of Stakeholder Theory1
In his review of Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract (Mansell, 2013a)
Jeroen Veldman argues that the book fails to engage critically with the ‘synthetic
construct’ of the corporation. While Veldman is in agreement with the book’s
conclusion that ‘claims in stakeholder theory remain little more than inconsistent and
untenable moral claims to entitlement’, he nonetheless objects that my argument
reinforces ‘the neoclassical framework of capitalist relations’ by omitting any scrutiny
of the corporate form itself. Veldman does not engage directly with the book’s
central argument that ‘stakeholder’ conceptions of the corporation are inconsistent
with ethical principles that necessarily underpin the working of all market economies.
Instead, he criticises the book for what it apparently ignores: the ‘severe ontological
and methodological problematics’ of the corporate form. In this rejoinder, I consider
whether it is as serious an omission as Veldman suggests. In so doing I explore the
implications of his own position concerning the ‘double ontology’ of the corporation
and advocate an alternative approach to the question of the corporate purpose.
However, at the outset a clarification is necessary. Veldman presents my book as a
defence of ‘shareholder value maximisation’ and the superior social and economic
‘efficiency’ of the latter. He conflates my position with the consequentialist critiques
of stakeholder theory (exemplified by Michael Jensen) that identify long-term profit
maximisation with optimal ‘social utility’. I consider and ultimately reject this line of
argument. Instead, I contend that even though managers are answerable for the
pursuit of the corporate purpose ultimately to shareholders alone, this purpose
1 Published final version is forthcoming in Organization: the critical journal of organization, theory
and society (Sage).
involves a categorical imperative to further the well-being of non-shareowning
stakeholders.2 My book is not therefore an unqualified defence of ‘shareholder value
maximisation’ and nor does it endorse the assumption of self-interested economic
behaviour characteristic of neo-classical economics.
Regarding the broader debate about the corporate purpose, what is perhaps of greater
relevance than the exegetical aspect of Veldman’s review is the significance he
attaches to the corporate form itself. In recent years, Veldman and various co-authors
have made a sustained attempt to persuade organisation theorists to attend to the
question of what a corporation is and the consequences that are particular to this
organisational form (Veldman, 2011; Veldman and Parker, 2012; Veldman, 2013;
Veldman and Willmott, 2013). This work is part of a stream of research that
challenges the ‘nexus-of-contracts’ theory of the firm and, by emphasising the legal
independence of corporations from shareholders, convincingly undermines the
orthodox view that a corporation’s purpose is the maximisation of shareholder value
(Ireland, 1999, 2003; Stout, 2002, 2012; Robè, 2011, 2012; Deakin, 2012; Ciepley,
2013). However, Veldman in his review departs significantly from the assumptions
made by these other critics of ‘shareholder primacy’ and advances a radical position
that requires closer inspection.
The target of his criticism is the idea of the corporation as an ‘individual’ with
‘agency, ownership, and rights’. This is what he calls the ‘double ontology’ of the
corporate form. His argument is not aimed at the notion of corporate moral agency, a
topic on which much debate has ensued in business ethics journals from the
2 The Kantian argument for this position is developed in Mansell (2013b).
publication of French (1979). Instead, he appears to call into question whether the
corporation should be granted any legal agency at all. To strip the corporation of all
its legal rights, including the right to enter contracts and own property, would be to
deprive it of legal personality. Indeed, in an earlier article he recommends a ‘full
return to partnership law’ as an alternative to the contemporary theory of
incorporation:
‘…This position would entail the abdication of the attribution of agency,
ownership, and rights to a reified representation and therefore the loss of the
perpetuity, the holding company and the attribution of agency, rights, and
ownership. In practice, this would do away with the specifics of incorporation
for business representations altogether…’ (Veldman and Parker, 2012, p. 434)
Ironically, it is an insistence upon the ‘specifics of incorporation for business
representations’ that underpins the ‘wider critiques’ of shareholder primacy that he
defends in his review. If the privileged position of shareholders in corporate
governance derives from a claim to be the ‘owners’ of corporate assets (Friedman,
1970), then the ‘agency, ownership and rights’ of the corporation as an independent
person are incompatible with shareholder primacy. Robè (2011, pp. 3-4) argues: ‘In
their role as managers of the corporation’s assets, the officers are the agents of the
assets’ owner – the corporation itself. They are appointed by the board of directors
but neither directors nor officers are the shareholders’ agents because the shareholders
own neither the firm nor the assets controlled by the managers…’. Stout (2012, p. 37)
also remarks that ‘from a legal perspective, shareholders do not, and cannot, own
corporations. Corporations are independent legal entities that own themselves, just as
human beings own themselves’ (emphasis in original). Furthermore, Ciepley (2013,
p. 146) contends that ‘no natural person or group of persons owns the assets of the
corporation. The corporation owns corporate assets… just as the state owns state
assets and the church owns church assets. It is corporate property’ (emphasis in
original). Veldman’s critique of the ‘synthetic construct’ of the corporation is by
implication a challenge not only to the corporate status of business firms but also to
states, churches, universities and any other ‘corporate’ legal person. His comments
apply equally to my argument and to the ‘wider critiques’ that he advocates.
There are, of course, good reasons to be critical of the modern conception of the
corporation. The fact that the corporation is an independent legal person, with its own
rights and duties in law, can be taken to imply a purpose that is likewise its own and
independent of any natural person. If the interests of the corporation and the
shareholders are ‘meaningfully distinct’ (Phillips, 2003, p. 20), because the latter have
no claim upon corporate assets, then the same logic holds for other stakeholder groups
too. As Phillips (2003, p. 19) puts it: ‘If managers are agents or fiduciaries at all, it is
to the organization and not to the shareowners. The corporation… is an entity unto
itself’ (emphasis in original). If this is indeed the case, then which natural persons
have authority to hold managers accountable for acting in the independent interest of
the corporation? What would give any person or group the right to determine what
these interests are? In resting their case on the independence of the corporation from
its shareholders and other stakeholders, the critics of shareholder primacy do not
provide obvious answers. Indeed it is arguable that a major cause of the irresponsible
behaviour associated with large corporations today is the lack of accountability of top
management to any particular stakeholder group (the attenuated powers of
shareholders notwithstanding) with managerial behaviour influenced primarily by the
external pressures of financial markets.
Rather than arguing for the abolition of corporate legal status altogether or taking for
granted the corporation in its current legal form, company law might be reformed on
the basis of an older tradition that conceives of corporations as group agents.3
Corporations can be envisaged as communities that enable the pursuit, through the
corporate legal person, of the common interests of their members. Corporate legal
personhood would then be granted only to genuine group agents; that is, to groups
whose interests could be represented as if they belonged to one person. Directors’
duties would be owed neither to individual shareholder ‘owners’ nor to an
independent and impersonal corporation, but to the group agent incorporated in law
(the ‘principal’). In this case the interests and purpose of the corporation are identical
to those of the incorporated agent, and senior management is properly accountable for
its pursuit of this purpose.4
Clearly the challenge for this argument, in the case of a modern business organisation,
is to establish who this group agent might be and how they are to be identified.5 My
book engages critically with the idea that a business corporation can stand for the
interests of all its primary stakeholders. Attempts have been made to describe the
corporation as a ‘social contract’ between suppliers, customers, employees, financiers
and communities. I argue that these attempts fail largely because these groups do not
act together through the corporate form as a unified group agent. A more promising
strand of work can be found in Aristotelian theories of organisational ‘citizenship’ and
3 Medieval conceptions of corporations as autonomous communities and their gradual disappearance
with the rise of the modern state are expounded in Gierke’s Political Theories of the Middle Age
(1968).
4 This position would entail the revision of various parts of company law: e.g., Section 7 of the UK
Companies Act 2006 which states that ‘[a] company is formed under this Act by one or more persons’
(emphasis added).
5 Perhaps the most sophisticated recent attempt to answer the latter question is that of List and Pettit
(2011).
the ‘common good’ of the firm (O’Brien, 2009; Sison and Fontrondona, 2012;
Timming, 2014). Another productive approach is to consider existing theories of the
purpose of non-commercial corporations (states, churches and public universities, for
example). Should the interests of a university be identified with those of its students,
its staff, the ‘public interest’ or some combination of its stakeholders? Are the
rightful interests of a state those of its government, its ruling party, its legislature, all
its citizens or every person resident in its territory?6 The answers to these questions
matter because they shape the expectations we have of the leaders of universities,
states and other corporate persons, and the answers depend on what we think a
corporation is.
Of course, the concept of states, churches and universities as legal persons is far older
than the incorporation of modern business firms. Attempts by business ethicists to
theorise a more ‘socially responsible’ form of business (of which stakeholder theory is
a prominent example) would be enriched by an engagement with those disciplines in
which theories of incorporation already have a long history.7 On these points
Veldman and I are in agreement. Any critical enquiry into the moral consequences of
the corporate capitalist economy necessarily entails an account of the kind of entity
that a corporation is and how its legal privileges relate to the real interests of persons
with a stake in its activities. The key question is: which stakeholders have a right for
their particular interests to be represented by a corporation and to hold its
management to account? The aim of my book is to survey and analyse critically the
range of responses advanced so far.
6 The corporate status of the state is an increasingly examined topic in political theory: for example, it
is a salient issue in determining to what extent citizens have ‘collective responsibility’ for the actions of
their governments (Parrish, 2009; Stilz, 2011; Pasternak, 2013).
7 For example, Quentin Skinner (2009) provides a history of theories of the state from the 17th century
to the present day in which the ‘person’ of the state is a central motif.
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